| Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association | ||||||
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Supreme Court of the United States |
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| Argued November 5, 1990 Decided May 30, 1991 |
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| Full case name | James P. Lehnert, et al., Petitioners v. Ferris Faculty Association, et al. | |||||
| Citations | 500 U.S. 507 (more) 111 S. Ct. 1950; 114 L. Ed. 2d 572; 1991 U.S. LEXIS 3017; 59 U.S.L.W. 4544; 137 L.R.R.M. 2321; 91 Cal. Daily Op. Service 3972; 91 Daily Journal DAR 6313 |
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| Prior history | Cert. to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | |||||
| Holding | ||||||
| Unions may compel contributions from nonmembers only for the costs of performing its duties as exclusive bargaining agent. | ||||||
| Court membership | ||||||
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| Case opinions | ||||||
| Majority | Blackmun (parts I, II, III-B, III-C, IV-B (except final paragraph), IV-D, IV-E, IV-F), joined by Rehnquist, White, Marshall, Stevens | |||||
| Concurrence | Blackmun (parts III-A, IV-A, IV-B (final paragraph), IV-C, V), joined by Rehnquist, White, Stevens | |||||
| Concur/dissent | Marshall | |||||
| Concur/dissent | Scalia, joined by O'Connor, Souter; Kennedy (all but part III-C) | |||||
| Concur/dissent | Kennedy | |||||
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, 500 U.S. 507 (1991) deals with First Amendment rights and Unions in public employment.[1] Due to collective bargaining laws in some states (in this case, Michigan), employees in the public sector (in this case, a university) are often required to either join a union or pay a “service fee” to a union (in this case, the Ferris Faculty Association, Michigan Education Association, and National Education Association) for the collective bargaining services. This case pertains to the usage and collection of union dues in the form of “service fees” from dissenting nonmember employees. The Plaintiffs argued that their required “services fees” are not going toward collective bargaining, but rather toward other union activities with which they disagree (such as political lobbying), and thus the compulsory fees are a violation of their freedom of speech rights.[1] The defendant union argued that their non-bargaining activities are “designed to influence the public employer's position at the bargaining table,” and therefore that they benefit the collective bargaining process. The court found that unions may compel contributions from nonmembers only for the costs of performing its duties as exclusive bargaining agent.
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The court found largely for the Plaintiff, but also continued to uphold the compulsory “service fee” itself and affirmed some of the questioned uses of the “service fee.” In general, freedom of speech rights are found to limit what “service fees” may be used for. The court ruled that the majority of the “service fees” collected in this case were used unconstitutionally. Also, the court now requires unions to provide an audited accounting report of their “service fee” spending to fee paying nonmembers.
This case provides broad clarification on the subject of required union fees in the public sector. It strikes down a previously used “three part test” in favor of a more practical one part test. This new test dictates that: “a union may constitutionally compel contributions from dissenting nonmembers in an agency shop only for the costs of performing the union's statutory duties as exclusive bargaining agent.” However, much leeway and uncertainty still exists regarding the acceptable use of union “service fees” in the public sector.
The court found that “a union may constitutionally compel contributions from dissenting nonmembers in an agency shop only for the costs of performing the union's statutory duties as exclusive bargaining agent.” These costs include:
The court also found that “certain other of the union activities at issue may not constitutionally be supported through objecting employees' funds.” These disallowed costs include:
The following cases are cited in the judgment of this case: